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I. Introduction
The Symposium is a pivotal text for interpreting Plato’s critique of poetry, 
and in particular his critique of the two genres of poetry that he appears 
to take most seriously, comedy and tragedy.1 Plato does not have 
Socrates offer the direct criticisms of poetry we ﬁnd elsewhere, but rather 
exposes the psychological root of those criticisms by staging a contest in 
self-understanding between Socrates and Agathon and Aristophanes. 
Agathon’s invocation of a contest in wisdom (peri tês sophias) with Socrates 
is one of the more prominent indications that the quarrel between poetry 
and philosophy is a central theme of the dialogue, and after the evening 
is dedicated to speeches praising Erôs, Plato conspicuously juxtaposes the 
speeches of the comic and tragic poets and the philosopher by means of 
the little stage business of Aristophanes’ hiccoughs.2 This quarrel becomes 
thematic in Socrates’ account of erôs, which turns upon the philosophic 
and poetic responses to the question of the human good. 
This suggestion immediately touches upon the central question posed 
for the interpretation of Socrates’ speech, which is whether its main subject 
is the good (to agathon) or the beautiful or noble (to kalon). The most 
obvious signs of this dilemma are that Socrates’ speech begins from the 
claim that erôs is directed towards the beautiful3 (201e4-5); subsequently, 
however, it seems to be directed towards the possession of good things 
always (205e11-12), which in turn proves to mean that erôs is the desire 
“to give birth in the beautiful” (206b6-7); and, ﬁnally, in its philosophical 
form erôs appears to be fulﬁlled in the apprehension of the beautiful itself 
(210e2-6). 
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Many commentators, ancient and modern, cut this knot with the claim 
that Socrates identiﬁes the beautiful or noble with the good, either without 
qualiﬁcation or by interpreting the beautiful as a species, a part, or the 
sensual aspect of the good.4 Given the close relation between truth and 
wisdom (e.g. Republic 508d10-e2), one might say of this view, with slight 
exaggeration, that it ﬁnds in Socrates’ speech the same message that Keats 
feigned to read upon a Grecian urn: “‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty,’ – that 
is all/Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.”5 But that is the teaching 
of another poet, Agathon (e.g. 196d5-197b5), Socrates’ direct competitor 
in the Symposium. Alternatively, since Socrates allots priority to the good 
elsewhere (e.g. Republic 505a2) and asserts here that he will select only 
the beautiful among the true things to say of erôs, it has been suggested 
that his apparent reversion to the beautiful is not genuine but a rhetorical 
accommodation to his contest with the poets.6 
The thesis advanced in this essay is that Socrates’ speech consistently 
differentiates the beautiful and the good, and that poetry (at least tragic 
poetry) and philosophy are distinguished by their relation to them. Plato’s 
critique of poetry in the Symposium derives from the contrast between the 
philosophic and the “poetic,” that is, productive or generative, responses 
to our mortality, and our mortality poses a question that turns out to be 
coeval with the question of the human good. In this account, poetry in this 
broad sense and tragic poetry in particular are, in a manner of speaking, 
apparently moved by the beautiful or noble as if it were the good, while 
making instrumental use of beauty or nobility in the attempt to be 
immortalized. The assimilation of the noble or beautiful to the good is 
transmitted to the political horizon, which the poets play such a large role 
in constituting. Philosophy, on the other hand, is indeed orientated by the 
good precisely in its contemplation or scrutiny of the beautiful. Socrates’ 
account is complex and his rhetoric is elusive because it mimics the self-
deception that he implies most of us practice concerning the ends of life. 
This thesis will be developed in an examination of the understanding 
of erôs, poetry, and philosophy in the speeches that Plato attributes to 
Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates.
A complication for any thesis concerning this topic is presented by 
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the well-known difﬁculty of translating its chief terms. Poiêsis (literally, 
“making”; conventionally, “poetry”), for example, is not simply the 
composition of lyric verse. For Socrates and Agathon at least, “poetry” or 
“making” has a broad sense that comprehends all genesis or production, 
and a peak sense represented by the “making” of images and tales, 
especially tales of the gods, expressed in verse. Correlatively, the modern 
notion of the “ﬁne arts” is not current in ancient Greek thought: when 
Socrates asks whether poetry is “an art or a science,” that is, whether it is a 
technê (“skill, craft”) or an epistêmê (“knowledge, science”), he is assuming 
the rationality of these two and asking whether poetry can claim such 
rationality, contrary to the modern sense of the question whether something 
is an art or a science.7 Further, kalos denotes a kind of splendour that may 
refer primarily to the body or the soul or their attributes or products, and 
will often be translated “beautiful or noble” to suggest this range.8 Lastly, 
erôs denotes a passionate longing, comprehending if not reducible to 
sexual desire and different from familiar affection or friendship (philia); it 
will be transliterated when not rendered “love,” since it has connotations 
of daring and the contravention of law or convention (nomos) that seem 
beyond the reach of our use of “love.” These connotations are visible in, for 
example, Herodotus’ report that “Candules conceived an erôs for his own 
wife,” and that his acting on it precipitated his misfortune (Historiae I.8.1, 
emphasis added).9 In this essay the controlling notion of erôs considered as 
the passionate desire for another is that which seems implicit in Socrates’ 
speech, in which erôs combines the desire “to be with” (including sexual 
union) with the desire “to look upon” the beloved (e.g. 211d3-8).
II. Aristophanes
Plato attributes the fantastic conceit to Aristophanes that erôs is literally 
our longing for our “other half,” from whom we have been sundered by 
the Olympian gods. We were once spherical beings, with two heads and 
two sets of limbs; double men, double women, or “androgynous” (i.e. 
half men and half women) in the likeness of the cosmic gods, the sun, 
earth, and moon, respectively. Our “proud thoughts” (190b6) led us to 
assault the Olympian gods. Zeus calculated that he could both weaken us 
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sufﬁciently and double the sacriﬁcial revenue by splitting us in two. He 
instructed Apollo to heal us in such a manner that we should contemplate 
(theômenos) our cut, and be reminded to fear the gods and be orderly lest 
we be split again. The plan failed; human beings clung to their desevered 
halves and began to die out from hunger and other forms of self-neglect. 
Zeus had Apollo change the sexual organs to the front so that the race 
might reproduce and that sexual relief might allow us to part and attend 
to the necessities of life.
Plato’s purpose is not to imitate Aristophanean comedy but to supply 
the poetic account of human nature underlying it.10 On the literal level, 
the myth’s details indicate that no one could ever meet their genuine 
“other half” after the ﬁrst generation, even if the latter survived the initial 
vivisection; in reality erôs leaves us with only “great hopes.”11 Human 
beings are comic because their deepest and most serious (megalês spoudês, 
192c7) aspirations are founded in illusion.12
The distance between the defective self-understanding of the lovers 
seeking their other halves and reality is the mythical reﬂection of the 
ambiguous status of erôs in Aristophanes’ speech. On the one hand, 
Aristophanes begins by calling for greater homage to Erôs as “a physician 
of those things whose healing, if they could be healed, would generate 
the greatest happiness for humankind” (189c8-d3). Such healing would 
lead us back to our spherical wholes, our “archaic” or “original nature,” 
and so “erôs is the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole” (189d6, 
193e5, 192e9-193a1). In sum, erôs is not so much a god as the desire that 
“leads us into our own” (oikeion, 193d2); the natural is identiﬁed as what 
would fulﬁll our desire to be wholly “our own.” Since this erôs is not 
reducible to sexual desire (192c5-7), it seems, to judge by the unexplored 
character of the original human beings, to represent our desire to be wholly 
independent. However, on the other hand, not only does it seem that any 
healing of our nature is impossible, but any reconstitution of our original 
selves would be a rebellion against the “current” order created by the 
Olympian gods and the standards of right or the laws that they sanction. 
Thus, Aristophanes’ speech does not conclude with a straightforward 
celebration of erôs, but with a warning to have “fear” and reverence for the 
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gods (193a1, 8). Aristophanes has created a fundamental tension between 
nature (physis) and convention or law (nomos), in which erôs is the desire 
to take one’s natural shape (phusis, eidos) and the power of the gods who 
sanction the laws (nomoi) opposes that desire (e.g. 189e5-6, d5, 191a4-5).
Thus, the quality of erôs is clearly antinomian in the etymological sense, 
since it opposes the standards or laws (nomoi) of the gods whether erôs is 
experienced as the desire for a substitute “other half” or is displaced upon 
politics; thus, Aristophanes explains, the “halves” of original androgynous 
double human become adulterers, those of women lesbians, and those 
of men homosexuals, not through shamelessness, but through daring, 
and these become ambitious politicians (191d6-192b5). An inherent 
complication of this picture is that not only the “present,” upright shape 
of human beings and their sexuality, but also their erotic disposition itself 
is caused by the work of the gods and the laws.13 On the non-mythical 
level, Aristophanes seems to teach that communal or political life effects a 
harsh but inescapable imposition upon our natural desires or our natural 
longing for independence, yet it is this very imposition that is itself 
responsible for the sense that there is some natural state of independence 
that we seek. When Aristophanes says that we must become friends, 
that is, become reconciled with Erôs (193b4), he presumably means to 
reconcile us with these political necessities so that erôs “leads us into our 
own” in the conventional and feasible sense. If correct, this interpretation 
explains why Aristophanes is readily identiﬁed as some kind of political 
conservative and provides the motive for two of the main threads of his 
comedy: obscenity undercuts any overwhelming and potentially illicit 
erotic attachments, and political satire undercuts selﬁsh or power-seeking 
politics which does not pay due heed to the common good or justice as 
expressed by the laws (cf. Laws 816d3-817a1).14
This interpretation does not bring out the widely acknowledged power 
of Aristophanes’ speech, which is sometimes defended as championing 
the love of a whole person, in the sense of a particular individual, as 
against Socrates’ apparent teaching that the beauty which leads us to love 
one person also leads us to devalue the individual as such in favour of 
loving beauty itself as such.15 However, this view overlooks the incipient 
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narcissism of the notion that the love of another is really the love of one’s 
own, and to hold this view one must renounce any intelligible reason 
why one prefers one’s beloved to any particular other. If wholeness must 
encompass qualities manifest in principle to all, then Aristophanes’ 
account does not justify loving a whole individual, but rather just this 
individual for no reason which can be expressed in speech. Therefore, if 
the power of Aristophanes’ speech resides in its championing of the love 
of the individual, it is because Aristophanes has fabricated a correlative to 
the feeling that there is nothing random in one’s choice of a partner, that 
love has overcome chance. This is presumably impossible. By extension, 
it might be suggested that on the non-mythical level Aristophanes wishes 
to teach that erôs is motivated by the equally impossible hope that we 
may overcome that element of chance or artiﬁce which belongs to the 
necessarily particular nomoi which form us. Our basic desire is a longing 
for a natural wholeness which never was and cannot be.
Plato’s implied criticism of Aristophanes emerges from the latter’s 
version of the opposition of nature and law or convention. It is a result 
of this opposition that there can be no accounting for the nature of the 
human mind, speech, or the soul prior to the operations of the Olympian 
gods. Thus, Aristophanes’ lovers cannot say but only divine or riddle 
at the very wholeness which is meant to constitute their genuine nature 
and the object of their desire.16 Aristophanes has Hephaestus ask a pair 
of lovers what they want from each other, but they are perplexed and 
he himself must articulate for them that they desire “to have become 
one from being two” (192d2 ff.). But simply being united is not at all to 
become whole, which is why the united couple may “become one from 
being two” indifferently alive or dead: such unity is the extinction of the 
desiring individual (192e1-3). There is thus no connection between human 
nature and the fully formed human faculties or the ends of human life. 
Consequently, Aristophanes cannot provide a natural standard for the 
“orderly”17  behaviour of human beings “now.” Nor can Aristophanes 
justify his own independent articulation of human nature, which he 
presumably does not intend to be merely conventional. These difﬁculties 
ultimately stem from Aristophanes’ effective reduction of the soul to the 
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body in the ﬁrst place, representing the desires of the soul as wanting a 
part of the body.18 Plato “makes a comedy” (kômôidei, cf. 192d8) of this 
by having Aristophanes silenced by his body before he can speak, and 
then, when he wishes to rebut Socrates’ criticism, silenced by the arrival 
of the Alcibiades.19
III. Agathon
Although it is routinely dismissed as a trivial linguistic display, 
Agathon’s speech makes one realize that Aristophanes has rendered an 
admired account of erôs without mentioning the desire to look upon the 
beloved, or, what is the same thing, without mentioning beauty.20 Agathon 
is the ﬁrst speaker to claim for erôs itself (apart from its effects) a dimension 
above the passionate desire for another, in the desire for or love of beauty 
or nobility (197b8-9). This view renders intelligible the passionate love 
of a particular other, as Aristophanes could not, but it simultaneously 
transcends the desire for any particular other. This is quite possibly the 
sort of incipient rationalism that causes Aristophanes to pair Socrates and 
Agathon in the Symposium, just as the historical Aristophanes connects 
Socrates with the decline of tragedy he sees in the likes of Euripides 
and Agathon.21 There are three prominent signs of this rationalism or 
artiﬁciality in Agathon’s speech in the Symposium, which help to exhibit 
his understanding of poetry.
Firstly, there is the self-consciously reﬂexive structure of his speech. He 
begins by announcing that he will say how one must speak and then speak. 
He says that he will ﬁrst describe Erôs and then his gifts; Erôs is most 
beautiful (or noble) and the best (or most virtuous); he is most beautiful 
because the youngest god, the most delicate, ﬂuid in form, and beautiful 
in colour; he is best because he is the most just, moderate, courageous, 
and wise. His gift is to makes others like himself. 
Secondly, Agathon identiﬁes his claim to distinguish Erôs from his gifts 
with a general rule for giving praise by stating “what sort of cause [and] 
of which things” something is (194e5-195a3). Agathon’s representation 
of the beauty and virtue of Erôs gradually tends to reduce the god to the 
psychological cause of certain effects. While Agathon says that “there is 
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need of a poet such as Homer was” (195c7-d2) for this representation, 
he clearly takes himself to be such a poet. Agathon’s appropriation of 
Homer’s lines on Atê to describe Erôs illustrates his forgetting of harsh 
necessities or the softness for which Aristophanes mocks Agathon in the 
Women at the Thesmophoria, as well as Agathon’s reduction of the god 
Erôs to a capacity of the soul.22 Both traits are also evident in his sophistic 
arguments that Erôs is most moderate because moderation is “mastering 
pleasures and desires, and no pleasure is stronger than erôs,” and most 
courageous because Arês is more courageous than anyone else and “not 
even Arês withstands Erôs,” having been defeated by “Aphrodite,” that 
is, by the pleasures of sex (196c4-d4). These arguments are not merely 
sophistic, they also illustrate Agathon’s forgetting of the harsher necessities 
of life which were prominent in Aristophanes’ speech; he suggests that the 
laws may be completely replaced by what is voluntary (196c1-3). 
Thirdly, Agathon asserts that Erôs’ most important virtue, wisdom, 
makes Erôs a poet who is able to make others into poets, not only including 
the arts (technai) possessed by craftsmen along with poetry more narrowly 
understood but also claiming that “the making (poiêsis) of all animals is 
the wisdom of erôs, by which animals are generated and by nature born” 
(196e6-197e3). The assimilation of wisdom to poetry is meant to show off 
his own wisdom, but far from arguing, say, that poetry is an art (technê), 
Agathon appears to allow that the conscious production of artifacts, 
whether technical or musical, may be assimilated to natural instinct. In 
the case of the craftsmen and poets, erôs is speciﬁcally related to becoming 
famous (197a5-6, and context). Given the relation between “the noble or 
beautiful things” (ta kala) and honour or glory, we may interpret Agathon’s 
claim that all good things come about through the erôs for ta kala (197b7-9) 
to refer primarily to the longing for such glory on the part of poets and 
technical innovators, as much as to the love of the beauty of the images of 
the gods that the former invent or the utility of the artifacts produced by 
the latter. This notion of the poet’s end will prove to be central to Socrates’ 
interpretation of the poets. 
Agathon provides a sample of verse of his own invention to describe 
how Erôs is a cause of “all good things for gods and human beings”: 
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He is the one who makes (ho poiôn)
 peace among human beings, and windless calm for the sea,
 the sleep of the winds, and rest amid care (197b7-8, c3-6).
Agathon describes Erôs as a poet who makes others into poets, and he 
here provides a demonstration of Erôs’ power to make Agathon into a poet 
who is in turn describing the effect of Erôs and so, in a sense, the meaning 
of poetry. Erôs is “the one who composes” or simply “the poet” (ho poiôn) 
and his poetry composes the soul or brings it peace. In describing this 
action, these lines move from human beings to larger powers of nature and 
then back to human experience, thus exhibiting one mode of how poetry 
works, which is to describe human affects through metaphors drawn from 
non-human nature.23 We might conclude that the purpose of poetry is to 
make literally true a state of the human soul through metaphor, that is, 
a kind of falsehood. In this case, one might also question the truth of the 
thought that erôs brings peace to the soul. Thus it is ﬁtting for Agathon 
to say, ambiguously enough, that Erôs is the “order” or “adornment” 
(kosmos) of all the gods and human beings” because the charm of poetry 
bewitches their minds: 
Erôs is the leader whom every man must follow, hymning him beautifully 
[or “nobly”], participating in the song which he sings, enchanting the 
thought of all gods and human beings (197e2-5).
The ultimate charm of by which Agathon’s speech seeks to enchant 
the mind is to conﬂate erôs with the end of desire. This conﬂation forms 
the crux of Socrates’ criticism of Agathon and of Diotima’s criticism of 
the young Socrates and “the many”: they all identify the qualities of what 
is loved with love, or they make erôs itself into something beautiful or 
noble and good, just as Agathon makes the cause of beautiful and good 
things into a beautiful and good god, who is immortal (197d5, 204c1-6, 
201e3-5, 203c6-d3). In his speech as a whole, Agathon gives an example of 
the poet’s art: he has tried to give form to erôs as the god Erôs, gathering 
together from various aspects of our experience the principles of that 
experience and trying to render them manifest in a being that is familiar 
because in some sense it has been given a human form. The fabrication 
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of the anthropomorphic gods are the means by which erôs, through the 
poet’s desire for a noble name, “empties us of alienation, but ﬁlls us with 
familiarity [oikeiotêtos: the sense of one’s own]” (197d1).
IV. Socrates
As we have seen, in the ﬁrst preliminary part of his speech Socrates 
pledges that his speech will be a ﬁtting arrangement of the beautiful or 
noble aspects of the truth about erôs (198a3-199b7). Socrates’ speech as 
a whole implies the priority of the good over the beautiful or noble, but 
he presents the good in its most beautiful or noble light, an ambiguity 
suggested by Socrates’ demeanour from the outset of the dialogue.24 In a 
second preliminary passage, Socrates conducts a dialogue with Agathon, 
which resolves the tension in the latter’s speech between Erôs as a god 
and erôs as a desire of the soul for “beautiful things” (esp. 194e7 and 
197b8). Agathon admits that erôs is a relation between the soul and what 
it desires and so lacks. Thus erôs cannot be beautiful, and, since Agathon 
agrees that good things are beautiful, he must also agree that erôs cannot 
be good (199c6-200b3). Deﬁning erôs as a desire relates it to time, since 
one can obviously desire for the future what one already possesses 
(200b4-d7). There is thus no erôs without soul, and since there is no soul 
without life, there is no erôs without death.25 From Socrates’ viewpoint 
the quality of one’s erôs issues from one’s response to this fact, a response 
that is either, on the one hand, broadly “poetic” or generative, or, on the 
other, philosophical.
Socrates defers the conclusion from Agathon’s admissions, that erôs 
cannot be a god, to Diotima, the imaginary interlocutor of his youthful 
education.26 Socrates too had accepted the thought “that Erôs was a great 
god, and is of beautiful things” (201e5), and is similarly compelled to 
admit that erôs is neither good nor beautiful according to his own account 
(201e5-7). The young Socrates wouldn’t “dare” say that a god is not happy 
in the possession of good and beautiful things (202c7-9), but there needs 
no daring now to say that none of the Olympian gods are really gods 
from this Socratic viewpoint, which accords with their assimilation to the 
unchanging, soulless forms elsewhere.27 
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Erôs may not be good and beautiful or immortal, but Diotima insists 
that he is not thereby bad and ugly or mortal; rather, he is something “in-
between” these inseparable pairs (toutoin, 202b5).  Her example of an “in-
between” is right opinion, which is in-between knowledge and ignorance 
because it hits upon being but cannot give an account (202a5-9). That is, an 
in-between somehow encompasses both extremes of an opposition, as in 
her parallel descriptions of erôs as being well-supplied with deﬁciency28 
and of the philosopher as resourceful because self-consciously aware of 
a lack of wisdom (203e4-204a7).
In the next section, Diotima splits apart the good and the beautiful or 
noble, which Agathon and the young Socrates had identiﬁed. She begins 
once more from their premise, asking Socrates, “the one who has an erôs 
for the beautiful has an erôs for what?”  Socrates answers that it is that the 
beautiful be one’s own, but he cannot say what such possession would 
bring. When Diotima suggests substituting the good for the beautiful 
Socrates readily answers that the possession of good things brings 
happiness (204d4-205a3). This answer only “seems” (dokei) to bring an 
end to the question because it leaves the good unspeciﬁed both in itself 
and in its relation to the beautiful. Diotima focuses on the latter question. 
She is about to show that almost everyone misunderstands their own 
good, and so although everyone “loves” (erāi) the good, we cut off a form 
of it and only call some people “lovers” (erastai). Diotima compares this 
usage to the fact that we also cut off a part of “making” (poiêsis) and call 
only those involved in the part concerned with the muses “poets” (poiêtai, 
205a9-c9). 
This is not an accidental comparison. Diotima will go on to claim that 
all mortal beings desire to be immortal, and that the apprehension of the 
beautiful is in effect the apprehension of the promise of fulﬁlling that 
desire, the response to which is productive or generative, a response that 
is typiﬁed by the lovers and the poets. Diotima concludes that the end of 
our desires is immortality through two intermediate deﬁnitions of erôs. 
Firstly, erôs is the desire to have the good always. This deﬁnition is not 
argued for, but it appears that the desire to be “always” (aei) somehow 
issues from the fact that desire, whenever one does desire, is “always” 
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(aei) of the good (cf. 206a11-12 with 205a7).29 Secondly, it follows that 
the “work” of erôs is “giving birth in the beautiful both in body and in 
soul” (207b7-8). The reason for this deﬁnition is more clearly brought out: 
everything mortal desires immortality insofar as lies in its power, and 
the only immortality for a mortal being is by the generation of another 
like itself (207d1-2, 206c5-7, e7-8). This desire is, however, a “device” 
(208b2) of nature, not a deliberate decision or an activity based on self-
understanding of the being concerned, just as the product that the desire 
issues in is not really a continuance of one’s self. Erôs is not really “of” but 
only “concerned with” (peri, 204c1-6) the beautiful because the beautiful 
or noble is somehow only a means to the good.
Thus our response to beauty is generative or productive, because 
we apparently – but only apparently, of course – live on in that which 
is produced. Those who are more pregnant in body seek to reproduce 
themselves by children, while those more pregnant in soul seek to leave 
behind a beautiful or noble name or, in Homer’s words, “to lay down 
an immortal fame for all time” (208c5-6). At the peak of this activity are 
the poets themselves, who educate in “phronêsis and the rest of virtue” 
(209a3). Diotima will refer to Homer and Hesiod as the makers of children 
for whom temples are built, children which inform the loves of people for 
each other and their understanding of the various human excellences.30 
Their “children” then are the gods and their ways, an interpretation 
which appears to ﬁnd conﬁrmation in Herodotus’ assertion that these two 
poets set down for the Greeks the being, shape, name, arts, and honors of 
their gods (Historiae II.53).  The memorials left by the great poets are in a 
sense more the product of their souls than that of lovers; yet, even for the 
poets, the deceptive character of the generative or poetic response to life 
is twofold: it is based upon the illusory end of immortality, and despite 
appearances it uses the beautiful or noble as an instrument to achieve its 
end or good. 
Diotima emphasizes that the desire for the beautiful or noble would 
appear to be quite “irrational” if it were not for the motive of fame, 
presumably because of the impossibility of becoming literally immortal 
by substituting another for oneself (208c3-4). These considerations do 
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not reduce the beautiful or noble to an illusion. In fact some awareness 
that one cannot actually become immortal is essential to the nobility or 
beauty of actions and words. It is for this reason that love and death are 
so often associated in literature, sometimes with seemingly insufﬁcient 
reason; that is why, for example, Shakespeare’s Juliet and Romeo speak 
in images of death from virtually the moment they meet, and why the 
couple are so quickly settled upon the tomb.31 The same phenomenon is 
essential to the recognition of nobility more broadly understood, although 
perhaps a Platonic education is necessary for it to reach the degree of self-
consciousness expressed in the melancholy of Cornelias Scipio Aemilianus 
Africanus when he watched his legions ﬁnally defeat Carthage after more 
than a century’s war. According to Polybius, instead of glorying in his 
victory Scipio was moved to reﬂect on the inevitable fate of Rome and 
quoted the words Homer puts in Hector’s mouth, “For I know this well 
in my mind and my heart: the day will come when sacred Ilios will be 
destroyed, and so too Priam and the people of Priam of the good ash-
spear.”32 The noble is always tinged with sadness. The admiration for 
those who act nobly or for a “higher good” is necessarily compounded 
with the recognition of the sacriﬁce of other tangible goods that such 
deeds exact. Thus it is not that the beautiful or noble is an illusion, but 
Diotima ﬁnds an element of ambivalence or self-misunderstanding in 
our poetic or productive activities which both respond to and embody 
beauty or nobility. Diotima borrows the words of a poet to illuminate that 
ambivalence or self-misunderstanding of our ends: “in sum, all desire for 
good things and for being happy is both ‘the greatest and a treacherously 
deceptive erôs’ for everyone” (205d1-3).
Diotima’s understanding of erôs is intended to comprehend and surpass 
that of the poets. All human beings desire the good, not the half or the 
whole, as Aristophanes asserted (205d10-206a2). It is because their desire 
for the good leads them to desire to be immortal that erôs is for “genesis 
and giving birth in” or “by means of the beautiful or noble” (205d10-206a2). 
The beautiful is subordinate or instrumental to the orientation by the good 
and not, as Agathon thought, identical to or the cause of the good: “beauty 
is only the promise of happiness,” as a modern “poet” said.33 
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The last section of Diotima’s speech, often called the ladder of love, 
represents an education via a progress upwards through the apprehension 
of the beauty or nobility manifested by bodies, souls, laws and practices, 
and the sciences, culminating in a single science of beauty itself. There is 
space here only for an observation on the priority of philosophy to poetry 
that this passage suggests. One must pass from the attraction to the beauty 
in one body to that in all because, “if it is necessary to pursue beauty in 
form (ep’ eidei), it would be a quite mindless (anoia) not to believe that the 
beauty of all bodies is one and the same” (210b2-3). Naturally the priority 
of mind and intelligibility make one wonder if the full experience of erôs 
can be preserved in philosophy.
Diotima states that the recognition of the kinship of the various 
exemplars of beauty is only possible “if the one leading leads correctly,” 
and the recognition of the superiority of the beauty of the soul to that 
of the body is accomplished by force of the political concept of honour 
(timiôteron), just as the beauty or nobility in laws and practices is seen 
only by compulsion (210a6-7, b7, c3). That is to say, the customary or 
habitual and punitive means which particular communities employ in 
varying degrees to transmit their convictions are necessary if one is to be 
able to give priority to the soul and to “see” or contemplate (theasasthai, 
210c3) the nobility of soul exhibited in actions, practices, and laws. 
Nobility and virtue or philosophy may be human ends by nature, and 
so by deﬁnition universal in some sense; however, one can know or see 
what is noble and good only after habituation in the mores produced by 
the legislator’s or poet’s art, and these are by deﬁnition conventional 
or particular. On this basis one might say that Diotima agrees with 
Aristotle that art or habituation completes nature.34 Of course the political 
community cultivates its members as citizens for its own sake, which 
differs considerably from taking that cultivation as a means to seeing the 
nobility of the soul regardless of the particular conventions it issues from, 
that is, as a means to philosophy.35
Diotima therefore concedes to Aristophanes the compulsory and 
particular character of the laws; however, unlike Aristophanes, who posits 
an impossible and pre-political human end, Socrates’ trans-political end 
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is grounded in a view of human nature that comprehends the capacity for 
speech and the intelligibility of beauty or nobility.36 Diotima also agrees 
with Agathon that eros is concerned with the beautiful or noble, but teaches 
that the lovers or poets misunderstand themselves in experiencing it as 
the end. The philosophic interest in beauty or nobility would seem to be 
non-productive in this respect because it resists the false inference to the 
desire for immortality. Socrates expresses this elsewhere by saying he is 
a midwife to the opinions of others and so sterile, by denying that he is a 
poet, and by saying that philosophy is studying to die (Theaetetus 149b4 
ff., Phaedo 64a4-6 and ff., Republic 330b8-c8). 
Diotima makes two presentations of the end of the progression in 
beauty or nobility. In the ﬁrst the philosopher may instantaneously catch 
sight of beauty itself, and such vision is that for the sake of which all the 
prior labours were undertaken: practice and production are for the sake 
of “theory” in the original sense of “seeing” or “contemplation” (210e2-6). 
In the second, she describes how beauty or nobility itself will appear to 
the imagination (phantazesthai) as separate from any particular beautiful 
things yet responsible for their beauty (211a5-d1). Then she offers the 
prospect that one may “touch” (haptoito, 211b7, cf. 212a4) this product of 
the imagination of philosophic poetry, the beautiful or noble itself, thus 
going beyond “looking upon” it to “being with” it, knowing what it is in 
itself, and subsequently producing true virtue. She offers, in sum, a picture 
of reaching the end of philosophy and becoming wise regarding at least 
this part of the whole (211d7-8, 212a1-5). It seems at least arguable that she 
presents an image that exceeds her own deﬁnition of what may be accepted 
as knowledge (202a6-7). Certainly she makes this positive claim with the 
same term that Socrates uses to reject Agathon’s claim that wisdom may 
be conveyed by touch (haptomenos, 175c7-e2); Socrates claims only that he 
is “persuaded” by her that erôs is one of the more useful fellow-workers 
for human nature (212b1-4). It may be Diotima’s ﬁnal claim to wisdom 
which causes him to characterize her as both wise and as someone who 
falsely claims wisdom, that is, “a perfect sophist” (208b8, c1; 206b6). 
However we interpret the ﬁnal section of Diotima’s speech, it does 
give priority to “looking at” over “being with” and so “making.” Thus, 
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if philosophy is characterized by the contemplation of the beautiful or 
noble this does not mean that its end is the beautiful. From the point of 
view of Socrates’ speech, the whole sphere of human activity is guided 
by an anticipation of the good, and the peak, self-conscious quest for the 
good is philosophy. Within that broader sphere are those motivated by 
erôs and guided by the beautiful or noble, in general the lovers and at 
the peak the poets. By contrast, philosophy is listed not with the poetic 
or generative activities but with goods that do not obviously share that 
aspiration (205d4-5). It may be that Socrates makes the most difﬁdent 
claim that his speech is actually a praise of Erôs (212b7-c3), because the 
priority of theory to practice extirpates the element of “being with” in 
erôs.37 The conscious priority of the good is visible in Diotima’s claim 
that “it is here, if anywhere, that life if worth living (biôton) for a human 
being - contemplating the beautiful itself” (211d1-3). This phrase reminds 
one of Socrates’ declaration in the Apology that “the greatest good for a 
human being is this, to make speeches every day about virtue and the 
other things you hear me conversing about in examining both myself and 
others, and the unexamined life is not worth living (ou biôton) for a human 
being” (38a2-6). This seems entirely consistent with the picture in the 
Symposium – the good is to be found in the contemplation of the beautiful 
or noble which is exhibited in the poems, laws, and practices produced 
by the poets, politicians and others. Why is the good found there? This 
question is not addressed explicitly in this text, but it seems to be because 
those whose poems produce or express the noble or beautiful identify 
the noble with the good, just as every regime must say that following its 
standards is not just noble but good for one.38 Thus the legislators of the 
city of Plato’s Laws claim to be tragic poets of the best and most beautiful 
tragedy in founding the regime “as an imitation of the most beautiful and 
best way of life” (817b1-c1), which is another way of saying that the law 
wishes to be a discovery of being (Minos 315a2-3 with 315a6-b12). Socrates’ 
turn to the contemplation of the beautiful or noble is thus a turn to the 
examination of authoritative opinions about the human good, and so one 
way of characterizing Socrates’ obliging philosophy “to examine life and 
customs [moribus], and good and bad.”39
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V. Conclusion
Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal 
that is struck with the difference between what things are, and what 
they ought to be…We shed tears from sympathy with real and necessary 
distress; as we burst into laughter from want of sympathy with that which 
is unreasonable and unnecessary…To explain the nature of laughter and 
tears is to account for the condition of human life; for it is in a manner 
compounded of these two!
 William Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Comic Writers (1841: 1-2)
In the Symposium, Aristophanes and Agathon provide comic and 
tragic perspectives upon the distance between human life and its end; 
both associate the role of the gods with the arts, laws, and discourse of 
civilized life, and give poetry the ﬁrst role in forming and ennobling, or 
in reconciling us to this life.40 For Aristophanes, comedy both expresses 
and ridicules our resentful desire for some impossible natural fulﬁllment 
or absolute autonomy against the arbitrary constraints of civilization. In 
Agathon’s speech it appears that the emulation of poets and innovators 
in the arts is the mainspring of civilized life, like the “good strife (eris)” in 
Hesiod.41 The beauty or nobility Agathon enjoins in this text seems not to 
express the nobility of the tragic hero, yet he does illustrate the function of 
the poet as the maker of beautiful gods. This gives tragedy some priority 
over comedy, as Socrates suggests at the ends of the dialogue:42 icon 
making must precede iconoclasm however edifying in intention. 
Socrates’ speech makes the case for philosophy’s comprehension 
of comedy and tragedy. Philosophical inquiry is founded both in the 
recognition of the necessary arbitrariness or incompleteness of human 
life and in the apprehension of beauty and nobility, or the examination 
of the promise of its completion. In so doing it provides a psychological 
criticism of the poets on two grounds. Firstly, their rendering of human 
nature elides the faculties of speech and mind that would justify their own 
“high thoughts” (190b6). Secondly, it is claimed, the beauty or nobility of 
their works is in the service of the poets’ own desire for self-perpetuation, 
which depends upon the perpetuation of the virtues they articulate by 
the political community (cf. Republic 493d3-7). Although it may seem 
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paradoxical, in addition to the charge of self-misunderstanding, the root 
of Socrates’ political criticisms of poetry is the allegation that the poet 
must care too much for the political virtues. The basis for that allegation 
is that the poet thereby slights the intellectual virtues that enabled him to 
see what he could make (cf. Republic 599d7 ff., esp. 600a1-7).
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Notes
1  The most prominent candidate for the peak of poetry appears to be the epic (see Symposium 
209d1-2), but Socrates calls Homer “the most poetic and the ﬁrst of tragic poets” and “the ﬁrst 
teacher and leader of all these beautiful [or “noble”] tragic things” (Republic 607a2-3, 595c1-3). 
Aristotle’s view is similar: he credits Homer with providing the model of both comedy and 
tragedy, offering the proportion that the Iliad and Odyssey are to tragedy as the Margites is to 
comedy (Poetics 1448b39-a3). That comedy is deﬁned by concerning the laughable (geloios) and 
tragedy the noble (kalos) is suggested at several points in the Symposium (e.g. 189a8, b3, 6-7, 
213c3-4; 212e7-8). It might be helpful to mention Aristotle’s deﬁnitions of tragedy and comedy: 
tragedy and comedy are differentiated by the quality of their protagonists, the actions of the 
tragic character being noble or serious and those of the comic character mean or inferior (1448a1-
b3, 24-38, 1449b24-28). Tragedy causes pity and fear, which are elicited by imagining that some 
evil which is painful and destructive will happen to someone unworthy of it (Rhetoric 1382a21-2, 
1385b11-16). Comedy concerns “the laughable, which is a part of the disgraceful,” that is, of an 
“error or disgrace which is painless and not destructive” (Poetics 1449a33-5).
2  175e7-9; 185c5 and ff. The latter incident not only provides a comment on Aristophanes, it brings 
together the comic and tragic poet with Socrates as the second and weightier half of the six 
speeches on erôs (Clay 1993 provides a thorough discussion of this point). Socrates directs explicit 
criticism only at the speeches of the poets. Henceforth, citations of Plato will appear in the text, 
those for the Symposium without a title, according to the line numbers of the Oxford edition, vol. I, 
ed. E. A. Duke, et al. (1995), vols. II-V ed. J. Burnet (1905-13), and the single volume of the Republic, 
ed. S. R. Slings (2003). Citations of other classical texts will employ the standard references of the 
editions listed in the Bibliography. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
3  “The beautiful” will frequently translate ta kala (literally “the beautiful (or noble) [things]”). The 
nominalization of adjectives is less common in English (e.g. “the great and the good”), but the 
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alternatives seem at least as unhelpful. 
4  L. P. Gerson has recently sought to revive the Neo-Platonic version of the identiﬁcation of the 
good and the beautiful (not excluding Proclus’ view of Platonism or Plotinus’ understanding of 
Plato’s notion of the good as “lover of itself”), which Gerson claims constitutes our best chance 
of “A Platonic Reading of the Symposium” (2006: 55). Christopher Rowe identiﬁes the beautiful as 
a species of the genus, the good (1998: 244 ff.). R. E. Allen identiﬁes the good and the beautiful, 
asserting that the beautiful is the sensible aspect of the good (1991: 45, 54, 85). Gould calls the 
beautiful “a special, electrifying example of the good” (1963: 46). We shall claim that the beautiful 
is not homogeneous with the good, regardless of the voltage.
5  Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” V.9-10 (n.d.: 248).
6  This seems to be the position of Allan Bloom (1993: 522). In a book notable for its anti-reductive 
retrieval of classic texts, Bloom might appear at this point to be reductive about the beautiful or 
noble. Gerson (2006: 51, n. 10) claims with some reason to see the same position in Leo Strauss’ 
published seminar notes on the Symposium: Strauss claims that Diotima distinguishes the good 
and the beautiful, but he states that “in the ﬁnal presentation the beautiful is substituted for 
the good, and this is another indication of what I call the poetic presentation of philosophy” 
(2001: 200 and 238). Gerson remarks, “[i]n such a presentation there is no compelling need for 
consistency” (2006: 51, n. 10). But is consistency the only aim of poetry (as opposed to the account 
of poetry)? Outside of these two isolated statements Strauss develops the proposal that this 
substitution is not merely rhetorical but rather that the love of the beautiful is an aspect of the 
poetic response to the fundamental love of the good (2001: 241-2). The position of this essay is 
closer to this second interpretation, and to that of Stanley Rosen (1982: 273) and Seth Benardete 
(2000: 181).
7  Cf. Apology 22a1-e6 and the Ion. It is easy to misunderstand Plato’s position because when we ask 
whether something is “an art or a science” we usually assume an opposition between the two 
(the more intuitive or creative versus the rational). Cf. the remarks of E. H. Gombrich, the author 
of a prominent text in art history, which begins with the statement that “[t]here is no such thing 
as art” (1995: 4). He explains this assertion as follows: “I go back deliberately to the old meaning 
of the term ‘art,’ when art was identiﬁed with skill or mastery – the art of war, the art of love, or 
whatever else. Art is something with a skill, there’s no disembodied skill as such; skill is always 
applied to a particular task…For Leonardo, arte was a skill, a know-how applied both to his 
scientiﬁc experiments and to his painting” (quoted from an interview with Carrier 1996: 67). 
8  It is a commonplace that the word kalos may denote “beautiful, noble, decent, proper, specious, 
useful, admirable,” and so forth. If there were an English word that approximately encompassed 
this range we could employ it consistently and try to solicit Plato’s intention from its various 
usages, but there is no such word. The word “ﬁne,” which is sometimes so used, is not only 
too narrow but those who use it to refer to bodily splendor now seem to belong to a different 
linguistic group from those who use it to refer to the soul. Joe Sachs, in his consistent if 
idiosyncratic translations of Plato and Aristotle, claims that we can simply use “beauty” on the 
grounds that we can say “that was a beautiful thing you did” (his most extensive discussion of 
this point appears in “Part III: The Noble?” of his translation of Aristotle’s Ethics: 2002: xxi-xxv, 
quoted from xxii). This seems to me quite wrong. If the word ‘noble’ “probably denotes some 
sort of highminded naiveté, something hopelessly impractical” (2002: xxi), that is due to the low, 
calculable utility of what is considered “practical” in this time and place, especially since the ﬁrst 
and increasingly since the last war. Such a view is precisely the contrary of the notion common to 
many of the classical poets and philosophers that the practical is the arena of the noble. 
9  Cf. Thucydides’ report that “erôs fell upon all alike to send the expedition” to Sicily, which was 
ultimately the downfall of Athens (Historiae, VI.24.3). The date of the Symposium and the presence 
of Alcibiades make the Sicilian expedition and the violation of the Hermes and of the mysteries 
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and their aftermath all part of the context of the dialogue. For discussion see Rosen (1987: 7-8, 285-
6 and ff.).
10  Thus Dover is right to say that those who seek to construct a “hypothetical comedy” out of the 
tale are “confounding essence and accident” (1966: 41). Less plausible is Dover’s claim that 
Aristophanes’ tale can account for “the observed facts” of erôs or love better than does Socrates’ 
(see note 15 below).
11  elpidas megistas (193d3). Aristophanes claims that even when someone does meet their other half 
they “are then wondrously struck senseless with affection and intimacy, and with erôs” (192b7-
c1). Presumably they are struck with erôs at the very moment when the desire for union should 
be satisﬁed because of the intuitive knowledge that they are not genuine other halves and that 
they cannot truly become one from being two. Otherwise put, they sense that they must separate 
again, if only at death, or that no human union can truly satisfy them.
12  Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1159b16-17: it is laughable for a lover to expect to be loved in 
return.
13  Note that the original “double” humans are apparently already paying obeisance to the 
Olympians before their revolt, and that there seems to be no question they might succeed in 
defeating the Olympians and becoming independent of them. 
14  E.g., one of Aristophanes’ chief editors, Dover, characterizes the “the recurrent political themes” 
in Birds as “a familiar one: old ways good, new ways bad” (1993: 69). Rosen discusses the political 
character of the plays, and also suggests that Aristophanes’ intends his obscenity “either to 
restrict Eros through the body or to turn Eros against itself” which also accounts “perhaps for [the 
obscenity] of later moralists like Rabelais and Swift” (1987: 121 and ff.; quoted at 125).
15  Martha C. Nussbaum, for example, takes Aristophanes to teach that “the individual is loved 
not only as a whole, but also as a unique and irreplaceable whole,” a teaching which is then 
realized “in the person and story of Alcibiades” (1987: 173, 197). Nussbaum admits this makes our 
preference for another “mysterious,” just as Dover asserts that “the most singular characteristic 
of love” is that someone may have a “preference” for another without that other possessing 
“objectively desirable qualities” that anyone else may understand, which “preference is unshaken 
by the accessibility of [another] inﬁnitely desirable”  person (1966: 48-50). These views seem 
to betray “the observed facts” of love, as these have always sought expression in literature, by 
overlooking the complexity of erôs and/or of love, not to mention that Alcibiades’ “person and 
story” expresses a conﬂict chieﬂy between his attractions to philosophical protreptic and to 
political glory and not simply a preference for a whole individual.
16  Cf. 192c7-d2 with Republic 505e1-3 and ff. 
17  kosmoi, 193a4; kosmioteros, 190e4. Kosmios is derived, obviously, from kosmos. One could express the 
problem of nature for Aristophanes by saying that the cosmic gods from which human nature is 
derived can tell us nothing about the virtue or “orderliness” of human beings (see Strauss 2001: 
144).
18  No details are provided concerning the possible communion of the two halves before they were 
split. Their togetherness seems to be limited to the physical and this is how the inarticulate desire 
to be re-united is represented.
19  185c5 and ff. and 212c4 and ff.; cf. 193d6-8. That Alcibiades’ entrance disrupts Aristophanes is, 
we take it, a hint that political ambition or the love of the noble contains elements not explicable 
in Aristophanes’ schema. That is, even if Aristophanes is right that there is a displacement of the 
longing for wholeness upon the longing for power, he cannot then account for a love of what is 
splendid (the beautiful or noble) for its own sake, or a longing not only to be admired for one’s 
virtues but to actually possess the various excellences for which one is admired. This is the 
dialectic of honor that allows Socrates to attract Alcibiades for a time at least (cf. Alcibiades I with 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1095b22-30).
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20  For example, R. E. Allen’s insightful criticism of Aristophanes’ speech contrasts with a brief 
delineation of Agathon’s speech that is chieﬂy occupied with showing it to be an example of 
Gorgias’ style of rhetoric (1991: 38-40).
21  At the end of his speech Aristophanes refers to “what each of the remainder will say, but rather 
what each of the pair [hekateros] will say, for Agathon and Socrates remain” (193d8-e2). For the 
connection between Socrates, Agathon, and Euripides, see esp. Frogs 1491-5 in the context of 
the contest between Euripides and Aeschylus; Clouds 1371 in the context of 1321 and ff.; and 
Agathon’s role in the Women at Thesmophoria esp. 173-4, 193 and ff.
22  The Women at Thesmophoria is obviously predicated on the perceived softness or effeminacy of 
Agathon and his works. Agathon’s quotation from Homer omits the following words, that Atê in 
walking on their heads is “harming human beings” (Iliad 19.94). For commentary see Rosen (1987: 
178-9).
23  Rosen (1987: 195) wonders why it is that, “although Agathon links gods and men thoughout 
his speech, when he is moved to poetry the gods are replaced by nature”: surely it may be 
because it is “the irony of Plato, who inspires Agathon to prophesy the real consequences of his 
interpretation of Erôs,” but is it not also a demonstration of how Agathon believes that poetry 
has the power to remake human nature? Strauss (2001: 166-7) proposes that the metaphorical 
means by which “eros as human love [can] be responsible for quieting winds and waves” is “a 
kind of parody of what poetry does with eros,” by which he appears to mean its falsiﬁcation and 
construction into a self-subsisting being (2001: 177-7 with 156, 162, and 165).
24  Socrates has made himself “beautiful or noble” (houto kalos gegenemenos) for the occasion when 
he meets Aristodemus (174a5, 8-9), and explains that he has “beautiﬁed [him]self in order to be 
beautiful in going to the beautiful,” not ‘the good going to the good,’ which obviously puns on 
Agathon’s name (174b3-c4). 
25  Assuming with Socrates in Plato that the characteristics of life and thought are the attributes of 
the soul (e.g. Republic 353d3-12; cf. Aristotle, de Anima 405b11 ff. with 414b29 ff.).
26  The ﬁctional report Socrates makes of his dialogue with Diotima seems to refer to a dramatic date 
in the vicinity of 440 BC, although it represents an indeterminate period of instruction. This date 
is calculated on the basis of the reference to Diotima’s delaying of the Athenian plague of 330 
BC by ten years (Smp. 210d; so, e.g., Bury, 1932: 94-5). The Symposium thus represents the third 
youngest portrait of Socrates in the dialogues, following his autobiographical account of his early 
interest in the “inquiry into nature” in the Phaedo, and his encounter in the Parmenides, when 
his ﬁrst venturing of the hypothesis of the forms is subjected to refutation by Parmenides (for a 
useful summary of the evidence for the dramatic dates see Nails, 2002: 308-9, 314-5, 323-4). The 
Symposium supplies us with an essential aspect of Plato’s depiction of the “Socratic turn” from 
natural science to dialogue, the “forms,” and erôs (for some discussion of this point see Rosen 
1987: 221-5; Benardete 2000: 178-9; and Strauss 2001: 17-18, 186-7). No assumptions about the 
chronology of Plato’s writings or the development of his thought are made in this essay.
27  As, e.g., in the latter part of Republic Book II. Perhaps one might say that the forms are what the 
gods become when the confusion of desire and that which is desired has begun to be resolved.
28  See, e.g., the expression “Isn’t it the case that erôs is, ﬁrst, of some certain things, [and] secondly, 
that it is of whichever things the lack of which is ready to hand [parêi]” (200e8-9). One’s lack 
constitutes an aspect of one’s holdings, as it were. Bury comments that “[t]his sounds like a 
jocular constradiction in terms: in Erôs there is a plentiful lack” (93, ad 200e). Bury possibly refers 
to the “plentiful lack of wit” Hamlet implies Polonius has (Hamlet II.ii.199), but of course the self-
ignorance of a Polonius is just what this does not refer to, “for this is the difﬁculty of ignorance, 
that what is not noble and good nor intelligent seems to itself sufﬁcient, so whoever supposes that 
he is not in need does not desire what he lacks” (204a4-5).
29  This seems to be the reverse of the error that Socrates alleges the previous speakers committed, 
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and of which Agathon, the young Socrates, and “the many” are guilty; that is, of giving erôs itself 
all of the great and beautiful attributes possessed by the end of desire (198d7-e2, 203c6-7, 204c1-6). 
Cf. Benardete (200: 181).
30  See 209c7-d4 with 209a8-c7: it seems clear that the passage describing the speeches about virtue 
and what a good man must practice that arise between those lovers who love each others’ souls 
as well as their bodies appears here because those speeches are informed by the creations or 
“children” of the poets.
31  E.g. II.iii.83-4, III.v.17-25, 54-6.
32  Polybius Histories 38.22 (a fragment from Appian; cf. the fragment from Plutarch preserved as 
38.21.1-2). The quote is from Iliad VI.447-9.
33  Stendhal (1927: 44, n. 1, emphasis added).
34  Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1094b27-1095a13; Physics 194a21-28. 
35  This is of course a great theme in Plato. For one articulation of it, see, e.g., Republic 476a5-b2, 
478e7-479a7, d2-4, 480a1-12.
36  Cf. the use of the word eidos in the three speeches (189e3, 196a2, and 210b2).
37  In which case Diotima described the philosopher more accurately when she called erôs 
“homeless” (203d1). Diotima herself is a product of the poetic aspect of philosophy, as are 
the very speeches in which Socrates gives this account (cf. logous poioito, 207a6, in the light of 
the surrounding discussion of poiêsis). There is no space here to explore the poetic aspect of 
philosophy as it is presented in this dialogue, but it seems safe to argue that it is represented as 
subordinate to seeing or knowing.
38  This is the theme of the ﬁrst half of the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus in the Apology 
(24c10-26b2).
39  Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV.iv [10-11].
40  For the connection between the arts and the Olympian gods see 190d6-191a3, 197a3-b7.
41  Works and Days, ll. 11 and ff., quoted at 24.
42  223d5-6: Socrates argues that “someone who composes tragic poetry by art is [also] a comic poet,” 
(223d5) but he does not specify that the reverse is true.
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